§ Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge
Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the witness' own testimony. This Rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.
Comment: This rule is identical to F.R.E. 602. It is consistent with Pennsylvania law.
Firsthand or personal knowledge is a universal requirement of the law of evidence. See Johnson v. Peoples Cab Co., 386 Pa. 513, 514-15, 126 A.2d 720, 721 (1956) (“The primary object of a trial in our American courts is to bring to the tribunal, which is passing on the dispute involved, those persons who know of their own knowledge the facts to which they testify.”). Pa.R.E. 602 refers to Pa.R.E. 703 to make clear that there is no conflict with Rule 703, which permits an expert to base an opinion on facts not within the expert's personal knowledge.
It is implicit in Pa.R.E. 602 that the party calling the witness has the burden of proving personal knowledge. This is consistent with Pennsylvania law. Carney v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 428 Pa. 489, 240 A.2d 71 (1968). As the Advisory Committee's Notes to F.R.E. 602 state, “the rule is a specialized application of the provisions of Rule 104(b) on conditional relevancy.” Thus, the issue of personal knowledge is a question to be decided by the jury, and the judge may do no more than determine if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of such knowledge. 27 Wright & Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6027 (1990). This appears to be consistent with Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 477 Pa. 132, 383 A.2d 858 (1978).
A witness having firsthand knowledge of a hearsay statement who testifies to the making of the statement satisfies Pa.R.E. 602; the witness may not, however, testify to the truth of the statement if the witness has no personal knowledge of the truth of the statement. Whether the hearsay statement is admissible is governed by Pa.R.E. 801 through 805. Generally speaking, the firsthand knowledge requirement of Rule 602 is applicable to the declarant of a hearsay statement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, supra and Carney v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra. However, in the case of admissions of a party opponent, covered by Pa.R.E. 803(25), personal knowledge is not required. See Salvitti v. Throppe, 343 Pa. 642, 23 A.2d 445 (1942); Carswell v. SEPTA, 259 Pa. Super. 167, 393 A.2d 770 (1978). Moreover, Pa.R.E. 804(b)(4) explicitly dispenses with the need for personal knowledge for statements of personal or family history. In addition, Pa.R.E. 803(19), (20) and (21) impliedly do away with the personal knowledge requirement for statements dealing with reputation concerning personal or family history, boundaries or general history, and a person's character.