§ Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification
(a) General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be.
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation.
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated.
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker.
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to be the one called, or (B) in the case of a business, the call was made to a place of business and the conversation related to business reasonably transacted over the telephone.
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. Evidence that a document or data compilation, in any form, (A) is in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 30 years or more at the time it is offered.
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.
(10) Methods provided by law. Any method of authentication or identification provided by statute or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Comment: Paragraph 901(a) is identical to F.R.E. 901(a) and consistent with Pennsylvania law. Although the authentication or identification requirement has not been authoritatively defined, Pennsylvania courts have imposed the requirement. It may be expressed as follows: When a party offers evidence contending either expressly or impliedly that the evidence is connected with a person, place, thing or event, the party must provide evidence sufficient to support a finding of the contended connection. See Commonwealth v. Pollock, 414 Pa. Super. 66, 606 A.2d 500 (1992); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980).
In some cases, real evidence may not be relevant unless its condition at the time of trial is similar to its condition at the time of the incident in question. In such cases, the party offering the evidence must also introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the condition is similar. Pennsylvania law treats this requirement as an aspect of authentication. See Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980); Heller v. Equitable Gas Co., 333 Pa. 433, 3 A.2d 343 (1939).
Demonstrative evidence such as photographs, motion pictures, diagrams and models must be authenticated by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately represents that which it purports to depict. See Nyce v. Muffley, 384 Pa. 107, 119 A.2d 530 (1956).
Paragraph 901(b) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b).
Paragraph 901(b)(1) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(1). It is consistent with Pennsylvania law in that the testimony of a witness with personal knowledge may be sufficient to authenticate or identify the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Hudson, 489 Pa. 620, 414 A.2d 1381 (1980); Heller v. Equitable Gas Co., 333 Pa. 433, 3 A.2d 343 (1939).
Paragraph 901(b)(2) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(2). It is consistent with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111, which also deals with the admissibility of handwriting.
Paragraph 901(b)(3) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(3). It is consistent with Pennsylvania law. When there is a question as to the authenticity of an exhibit, the trier of fact will have to resolve the issue. This may be done by comparing the exhibit to authenticated specimens. See Commonwealth v. Gipe, 169 Pa. Super. 623, 84 A.2d 366 (1951) (comparison of typewritten document with authenticated specimen). Under this rule, the court must decide whether the specimen used for comparison to the exhibit is authentic. If the court determines that there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the specimen is authentic, the trier of fact is then permitted to compare the exhibit to the authenticated specimen. Under Pennsylvania law, lay or expert testimony is admissible to assist the jury in resolving the question. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.
Paragraph 901(b)(4) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(4). Pennsylvania law has permitted evidence to be authenticated by circumstantial evidence similar to that discussed in this illustration. The evidence may take a variety of forms including: evidence establishing chain of custody, see Commonwealth v. Melendez, 326 Pa. Super. 531, 474 A.2d 617 (1984); evidence that a letter is in reply to an earlier communication, see Roe v. Dwelling House Ins. Co. of Boston, 149 Pa. 94, 23 A. 718 (1892); testimony that an item of evidence was found in a place connected to a party, see Commonwealth v. Bassi, 284 Pa. 81, 130 A. 311 (1925); a phone call authenticated by evidence of party's conduct after the call, see Commonwealth v. Gold, 123 Pa. Super. 128, 186 A. 208 (1936); and the identity of a speaker established by the content and circumstances of a conversation, see Bonavitacola v. Cluver, 422 Pa. Super. 556, 619 A.2d 1363 (1993).
Paragraph 901(b)(5) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(5). Pennsylvania law has permitted the identification of a voice to be made by a person familiar with the alleged speaker's voice. See Commonwealth v. Carpenter, 472 Pa. 510, 372 A.2d 806 (1977).
Paragraph 901(b)(6) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(6). This paragraph appears to be consistent with Pennsylvania law. See Smithers v. Light, 305 Pa. 141, 157 A. 489 (1931); Wahl v. State Workmen's Ins. Fund, 139 Pa. Super. 53, 11 A.2d 496 (1940); see also2 McCormick, Evidence § 226 (4th ed. 1992).
Paragraph 901(b)(7) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(7). This paragraph illustrates that public records and reports may be authenticated in the same manner as other writings. In addition, public records and reports may be self-authenticating as provided in Pa.R.E. 902. Public records and reports may also be authenticated as otherwise provided by statute. See paragraph 901(b)(10) and its Comment.
Paragraph 901(b)(8) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(8), except that the Pennsylvania rule requires thirty years, while the Federal Rule requires twenty years. This change makes the rule consistent with Pennsylvania law. See Commonwealth ex rel. Ferguson v. Ball, 277 Pa. 301, 121 A. 191 (1923); Jones v. Scranton Coal Co., 274 Pa. 312, 118 A. 219 (1922).
Paragraph 901(b)(9) is identical to F.R.E. 901(b)(9). There is very little authority in Pennsylvania discussing authentication of evidence as provided in this illustration. The paragraph is consistent with the authority that exists. For example, in Commonwealth v. Visconto, 301 Pa. Super. 543, 448 A.2d 41 (1982), a computer print-out was held to be admissible. In Appeal of Chartier Valley School District, 67 Pa. Cmwlth. 121, 447 A.2d 317 (1982), computer studies were not admitted as business records, in part, because it was not established that the mode of preparing the evidence was reliable. The court used a similar approach in Commonwealth v. Westwood, 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1936) (test for gun powder residue) and in other cases to admit various kinds of scientific evidence. See Commonwealth v. Middleton, 379 Pa. Super. 502, 550 A.2d 561 (1988) (electrophoretic analysis of dried blood); Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 413 Pa. Super. 498, 605 A.2d 1228 (1992) (results of DNA/RFLP testing).
Paragraph 901(b)(10) differs from F.R.E. 901(b)(10) to eliminate the reference to Federal law and to make the paragraph conform to Pennsylvania law.
There are a number of statutes that provide for authentication or identification of various types of evidence. See, e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6103 (official records within the Commonwealth); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 (domestic records outside the Commonwealth and foreign records); 35 P.S. § 450.810 (vital statistics); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106 (documents filed in a public office); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6110 (certain registers of marriages, births and burials records); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(c) (chemical tests for alcohol and controlled substances); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3368 (speed timing devices); 75 Pa.C.S.A, § 1106(c) (certificates of title); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6151 (certified copies of medical records); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104 (blood tests to determine paternity); 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4343 (genetic tests to determine paternity).
In general, evidence may be authenticated or identified in any manner provided by statute, these rules or decisional law. In some situations, decisional law has required strict compliance with a statute providing for authentication or identification of evidence. See Commonwealth v. Townsend, 418 Pa. Super. 48, 613 A.2d 564 (1992); Commonwealth v. Martorano, 387 Pa. Super. 151, 563 A.2d 1229 (1989).